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The Fiscal Consequences 
of Competition for Capital
Peter Fisher
University of Iowa
To state and local offi cials, competition for capital has become the 
driving principle underlying economic development policy, and the pol-
icy tools most readily available are tax cuts and direct subsidies. Thus, 
this chapter is partly about the long-run revenue gains or losses from 
economic development incentive programs. Such programs are invari-
ably touted as measures to expand the tax base and increase revenues, 
and offi cials generally assume that incentives in the long run more than 
pay for themselves. Is this really the case?
This chapter is also about the ways in which competition for capital 
alters tax and budget policies more broadly. Has the perception by state 
and local offi cials that they must constantly compete for investment 
and jobs changed the structure of state and local tax systems? Has there 
been a broad shift away from taxes on business? Has this increased the 
regressivity of state-local tax systems? Have budget priorities shifted 
as well? 
COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL: THE POLICY TOOLS
The need for the broader view becomes clear as soon as one attempts 
to determine what constitutes an effort to compete for capital. Let’s 
consider the range of possibilities, from the narrowest to the broadest.
Discretionary incentives
• One-time subsidy packages negotiated with a specifi c fi rm.
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• Discretionary grant or loan programs provided out of annual ap-
propriations, where the fi rm must apply for funding. The pro-
grams could subsidize capital expenditure, provide free public 
infrastructure improvements, or pay for job training. 
• Discretionary tax abatements and tax increment fi nancing. These 
programs require no explicit funding, and so have no annual lim-
its statewide. 
Entitlement incentives
• Investment tax credits, jobs tax credits, or R&D credits under the 
state corporate income tax. Here the fi rm receives the benefi t au-
tomatically, provided the investment is in an eligible sector and 
that the size of the investment or number of new jobs exceeds 
some threshold. There may be geographic targeting: enterprise 
zones are the major example. 
• Local property tax abatements, where they are largely formula 
driven, once eligibility criteria have been met.
Tax cuts
• Competitive tax provisions. These are features of the tax code 
that apply to every corporation (though not equally) and that do 
not require investment or job creation on the part of the business, 
but where there is nonetheless a competition rationale presented 
to justify the tax expenditure. Examples are single-factor appor-
tionment, exemption of inventories from property taxation, and 
exemption of fuel and utilities from the sales tax. These tax pro-
visions are often advertised by economic development agencies 
as reasons to locate in their state.
• Broad-based tax cuts, such as rate cuts, that apply across the 
board to any business. Again, the arguments made in their favor 
may differ little from the more explicit development incentives: 
we have to cut taxes to remain competitive. The arguments may 
be extended beyond taxes that clearly fall directly on business to 
cuts in individual income taxes, for example, or the tax on capital 
gains. 
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Before addressing the broader effects of competition on tax struc-
ture and regressivity, we will explore what we know about the fi scal 
effects of explicit economic development subsidies: the discretionary 
incentive programs and the entitlement tax incentives. We begin by at-
tempting to defi ne what we mean by “fi scal effects” in such cases.
MEASURING FISCAL EFFECTS
What is a fi scal benefi t? A particular governmental action (such as 
providing a direct subsidy or cutting a tax) will have a positive fi s-
cal effect if, in the long run, it increases business activity and the new 
activity adds more in tax revenues than it causes in additional public 
service costs. There will then be a fi scal surplus to be distributed to the 
rest of the taxpayers as lower taxes or better services or both. (If the fi s-
cal surplus materializes only after some period of time, the discounted 
value must be positive.) Public service costs can rise in a number of 
ways, from direct expenditure benefi ting new businesses, to increased 
expenditure to serve new populations induced to in-migrate, to rising 
labor costs for government because of upward pressure on wages and 
land prices. 
This formulation ignores the distributional question: How is the 
surplus distributed among the population? As we will see, distribution 
is an important issue, but for now we will focus on measuring the fi s-
cal surplus. The logical place to begin is with the direct revenue from 
a new business. When an incentive program is put in place, subsequent 
investment will produce both direct revenue gains and direct revenue 
losses. The investment that would not have occurred but for the incen-
tive produces a gain; the remaining investment produces a loss, to the 
extent that it received the incentives (because they were entitlements 
or because they were awarded on the false belief that they were neces-
sary). As we will see, we have some pretty good estimates of direct 
fi scal effects.
What about the direct expenditure necessitated by new business? 
It is of course very diffi cult to measure or generalize about the local 
investment in infrastructure, or the ongoing increases in expenditure for 
services such as police and fi re protection, that is caused by new busi-
up07amritcCh.3.indd   59 4/11/2008   10:37:35 AM
60   Fisher
ness activity. It is a common assumption that these expenditures are not 
large, and that business activity generally produces a sizable fi scal sur-
plus. That’s certainly the argument made for seeking new commercial 
and industrial tax base—that this will permit tax relief for residents. 
Indirect effects are even more problematic. Here we must estimate 
the net fi scal effects of growth in the labor force or reduction in the local 
unemployment rate, including demands for additional services and the 
additional taxes produced by in-migrants or newly employed residents. 
These effects come about not only from the employment in the business 
receiving the subsidy, but new investment also may stimulate business 
expansion in supplying sectors, or in demanding sectors (who previ-
ously had to import inputs).
When new jobs are created in a community, those new jobs must 
be fi lled by persons in that community’s labor market in one of four 
ways:
 1) By drawing people from the ranks of the unemployed within 
the labor market.
 2) By drawing people into the area’s labor force who were not 
previously seeking work.
 3) By inducing people to migrate into the labor market.
 4) By drawing people away from existing jobs (which are then 
left unfi lled; if these jobs are, in turn, fi lled in one of the other 
ways, such as through in-migration, then the ultimate effect 
of the new jobs is simply in-migration).
In other words, new jobs can have four effects: lowering the unem-
ployment rate, increasing the labor force participation rate, inducing in-
migration, or displacing existing jobs. Research on the effects of “labor 
demand shocks”—a sudden increase in jobs as a result of a new plant 
or plant expansion—indicates that for every 100 new jobs in a region, 
about 7 will be fi lled from the ranks of the unemployed, about 16 by 
drawing existing residents into the labor force, and the remaining 77 
from in-migration (Bartik 1991, p. 95). These are the long-run effects 
(after several years); in the short run, there may be a more substantial 
reduction in unemployment, but as in-migration continues in response 
to the new job opportunities, the unemployment rate will creep back up 
again. Research also shows that such labor demand shocks will not have 
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a signifi cant long-run effect on wage rates for a given occupation; thus 
there will be little or no job displacement (Bartik 1991, Chapter 6). 
If residential development does not pay its way—and research gen-
erally shows that it does not—then in-migrants represent a fi scal drain 
(Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993, Chapter 6). The secondary effects 
of incentive-induced growth thus could be negative, since most of the 
jobs will in the long run be fi lled by in-migration. The remaining jobs, 
fi lled by existing residents, should produce a fi scal surplus, since those 
residents will presumably be paying more taxes but consuming the same 
(or perhaps less) in services. But this surplus (from 22 percent of the 
jobs) will probably not be enough to offset losses from the remainder.
There is some evidence on the net fi scal effects of concomitant 
expansions in employment and population. A study of Montgomery 
County, Maryland, concluded that for manufacturing facilities, dis-
tribution centers, small offi ce buildings, and even R&D facilities, the 
direct fi scal surplus from the business investment was insuffi cient (or 
just barely suffi cient) to offset the negative fi scal effects of accompany-
ing residential growth (Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez 1993). Only large, 
white-collar offi ce facilities generated a net surplus. Furthermore, Ladd 
and Yinger (1991) found that population growth produced an increase 
in the cost of city services. This is because as cities grow, labor and land 
costs rise, and congestion increases production costs; these effects out-
weigh the limited cost reductions achieved through economies of scale. 
The issue is not completely settled, however, due to the methodological 
issues that abound in performing a fi scal impact analysis. 
This raises an obvious question: If a new manufacturing or distri-
bution facility under normal conditions does not generally produce a 
large enough fi scal surplus to offset the fi scal losses produced by the 
residential development that follows that expansion, or produces only a 
slight net surplus, how could we expect subsidized business expansion 
to pay for itself?
The upshot is that it may well make sense to focus our attention on 
the direct tax effects of incentives. While pro-incentive or pro-growth 
advocates are fond of adding generous helpings of multiplier effects to 
their analyses, when we consider all of the evidence it seems likely that 
the fi scal consequences of these multiplier effects, and of the effects 
of population growth induced directly by the plant itself, are unlikely 
to be positive. (The exception is probably a project creating high-pay-
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ing, white-collar jobs.) When combined with the fact that we also must 
ignore the direct public expenditure effects of business investment, be-
cause we can’t measure it, the direct tax consequences of incentives al-
most surely provide a more favorable view of the fi scal effects of incen-
tives than would a more comprehensive analysis. If the direct business 
tax effects are negative, it is quite unlikely that the overall effects are 
anything but even more negative.
The way for a community to attempt to ensure that the direct tax ef-
fects are positive is to a) make sure you don’t give away all of your tax 
revenue to get the facility in the fi rst place or b) make sure the facility 
stays around long enough to pay a signifi cant amount of taxes, and c) 
provide incentives only in cases where the incentives are decisive. The 
trend is to provide ever more generous incentives, and we have already 
seen instances where states in effect give away everything, including 
the personal taxes of the employees (Michigan’s Renaissance Zones, 
Pennsylvania’s Keystone Opportunity Zones). And though almost ev-
eryone claims to be successfully applying a “but for” test in their dis-
cretionary incentive programs, given the asymmetry of information in 
negotiating subsidies, it is highly unlikely that this is the case.
So what do we know about the direct tax consequences of subsi-
dies and incentives? We look fi rst at the most publicized subsidies—the 
large, package deals offered to land a particular plant—and then at the 
tax incentives and tax cuts that function as entitlements, where most of 
the research has been focused.
THE PACKAGE DEALS
The large negotiated incentive packages represent the best case sce-
nario for positive fi scal effects because there is a greater probability that 
the incentive package may be decisive. The community is presumably 
exercising discretion, not simply handing out incentives by formula to 
all comers, and there is at least some indication that the community 
would not get the business without incentives, in light of what the com-
peting locations have to offer, in economic advantages as well as incen-
tives. While the costs per job have escalated dramatically, proponents 
may argue that the costs are not really costs at all, because the fi rm and 
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the employees (and all the multiplier effects) will generate tax revenues 
far exceeding the incentive cost.
Considerable attention has been paid recently to a paper by Green-
stone and Moretti (2003) for the National Bureau of Economic Research 
that purports to demonstrate that communities benefi t from offering 
subsidies to large plants. Greenstone and Moretti looked at a sample 
of major facility locations reported in Site Selection magazine, which 
identifi ed not only the county that “won” the plant but the one or two 
runner-up counties as well. The authors found that the winner and loser 
counties had similar rates of income growth prior to the plant opening, 
but that the winner counties subsequently experienced a statistically 
signifi cant boost in the rate of growth of wages and also of property 
values, as well as government revenues and expenditures. Princeton 
economist Alan Krueger, in a column in the New York Times, praised 
the study as “compelling” and claimed it showed that cities that offer 
generous incentive packages and win a large facility “seem to benefi t 
from the arrangement” (Krueger 2003). The clear implication is that 
even incentives amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars per job 
are worth the expense. 
A closer look reveals that this study tells us less than it might ap-
pear with respect to the fi scal consequences of such deals. The results 
in terms of economic growth are not surprising; what they show is 
that, comparing similar counties, the one that gets a new plant does 
better than the one that doesn’t—the growth trends in wage levels get 
a bump up. It would be surprising, in fact, if they didn’t. Nor is it re-
markable that both revenue and expenditure rose in the counties getting 
the economic boost from the new plant; one would expect that popula-
tion growth would require additional services, and local governments 
must balance their budgets. Expenditures, at least in some categories, 
exceeded the increase in population, but we do not know if this refl ects 
better services or higher costs of production. In sum, the results do not 
tell us whether the plants generated a fi scal surplus. There could well be 
higher taxes on residents and other fi rms to support the rising expendi-
tures necessitated by the new plant and its employees.
What about the fi nding that property values increased? Greenstone 
and Moretti (2003) argue that the net effects of the new plant—the in-
creased job opportunities and increased economic activity generally, as 
well as the cost and revenue effects of the subsidies and increased tax 
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base—will be capitalized into property values. If property values rise, it 
indicates that the net effect of the new plant has been positive. In other 
words, the cost of the incentives was more than offset by the other ben-
efi ts of the new facility. Note that Greenstone and Moretti do not claim 
that the fi scal benefi ts exceed the fi scal costs. Local government could 
well be facing increased expenditure demands that exceed the revenue 
gains, forcing higher tax rates for the same level of service; but as long 
as these fi scal losses are more than offset by other gains that translate 
into greater demand for land and housing, property values will rise. 
Greenstone and Moretti (2003) acknowledge that they are looking 
at the local benefi ts of new plant location, and that state government is 
paying part of the incentive cost. This is not a minor point. In my ex-
tensive research on economic development subsidies with Alan Peters, 
we found that a typical package of state and local grants, loans, tax 
credits, and tax abatements granted to a manufacturing fi rm (and most 
of the plants in the G&M study were manufacturing) consisted in about 
equal portions of state subsidies and local subsidies (Fisher and Peters 
1998). In enterprise zones, about 59 percent of the typical package in 
the 13 states we studied consisted of state incentives (Peters and Fisher 
2002, p. 112). The important point here is that local property values 
may refl ect most or all of the benefi ts of a plant location, but will defi -
nitely not refl ect about half of the costs (more in enterprise zones), since 
state costs will not be capitalized at all into local property values. Fur-
thermore, they assume complete capitalization of local incentive costs, 
which is quite doubtful. Previous studies of property taxes have gener-
ally found only partial capitalization. Their study therefore does not tell 
us, after all, whether the locality earns a fi scal surplus, nor does it tell us 
whether the overall benefi ts to the state as a whole exceed the state and 
local subsidy costs, which is the most important question. 
So what does the Greenstone and Moretti (2003) study really tell 
us about the wisdom of incentive policy? We don’t know the size of 
the winning and losing subsidy packages, nor do we really know if the 
subsidy offered by the winning county was decisive. We do not know 
whether the fi rm had already made up its mind where to go on the basis 
of economic considerations and was simply playing one community off 
against another to gain concessions. If the incentives didn’t matter, they 
were not a good deal no matter how much wages and property values 
rose. 
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We do know that even these negotiated incentives are not always 
decisive. For example, a debate raged in Nebraska in the early part of 
this decade over a package of $75 million in tax breaks to induce Union 
Pacifi c Railroad (UP) to move 1,038 jobs from St. Louis to Omaha. 
While UP told Nebraska offi cials that they would not move the jobs 
without the incentives, they were telling a different story in St. Louis, 
where company offi cials stated that the move was motivated by “criti-
cal strategic considerations, not tax incentives,” and that it made sense 
“from a synergy viewpoint” because the company’s IT staff was already 
in Omaha (Hicks 2004). And in Iowa in the early 1990s, when citizens 
took county supervisors to court over a subsidy to a planned IPSCO 
steel plant, the company was asked if it would reverse its decision to 
locate in Iowa if the lawsuit were successful; it said it would not. The 
company admitted publicly that the incentives made no difference. It 
is not often that we are provided such insights into corporate behavior, 
but it would be foolish to imagine that such instances of large incentives 
being granted unnecessarily are rare. 
Furthermore, these are short-run effects: the study looked at the fi rst 
fi ve years after a plant location. The long-run effect on property val-
ues may be lessened as the local housing market responds to the initial 
increase in demand brought about by the expansion of job opportuni-
ties. And the long-run effects could be wiped out altogether if the plant 
leaves. As my colleague Alan Peters has pointed out, many of the major 
disasters in the incentive wars have occurred after fi ve years, including 
the United Airlines facility in Indianapolis that closed, leaving the city 
holding the bag for $320 million in subsidies.
More importantly, the results of these fi ndings for a nonrandom 
sample of the largest package deals tell us little about the fi scal conse-
quences of incentive competition in general, including the more mod-
est one-time deals that are far more numerous, and including all of the 
entitlement incentives. 
ENTITLEMENT TAX INCENTIVES AND TAX CUTS
Let’s turn our attention now to the wide range of tax cuts and tax 
incentives that operate as entitlements. Here there is not even a pretense 
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of the fi rm making a “but for” determination. There is simply a belief or 
hope that the tax cuts will stimulate some growth that would not have 
occurred otherwise. But here we also have a more researchable ques-
tion: Do places that offer lower taxes, or tax incentives, grow faster than 
other places, controlling for all the other factors that infl uence invest-
ment and location decisions? 
This question has been extensively researched. We need not review 
that literature here, except to say that some have argued that a consen-
sus position has emerged that the interstate elasticity of economic ac-
tivity with respect to taxes on business is somewhere between −0.1 and 
−0.6, with the most likely fi gure −0.2 or −0.3 (Bartik 1991; Wasylenko 
1997). This position is not without its challengers. But let’s proceed 
for now with the assumption that −0.2 or −0.3 is a reasonable estimate. 
This means, for example, that a 10 percent cut in taxes would produce a 
2–3 percent increase in economic activity. What does this tell us about 
the fi scal gains or losses from incentives or tax cuts?
Bartik (1994) has argued that the fi scal effects of tax cuts are bound 
to be negative. He shows that tax revenues will increase approximately 
by the percentage increase in jobs induced by the tax cut, and decrease 
approximately by the percentage reduction in the tax rate. (The truly in-
duced jobs produce revenue gains; the tax cut on all the jobs that would 
have been there anyway [the noninduced employment] produces rev-
enue losses.) He then arrives at the formula for the net change in revenue 
per new job, expressed as a function of the elasticity E: 
        
Revenue gain (or loss) per new job = revenue per job × (1 + 1/E).
For the revenue per job term, Bartik substitutes the national average 
state-local direct business tax revenue per job across all business sec-
tors in 1989, which was about $1,620. Assuming an elasticity of −0.3, 
the average fi scal effect of a new job would then be −$3,780. Updating 
this estimate to 2003, we fi nd that business tax revenue per job is now 
probably between $3,000 and $3,700, depending on which taxes are 
included.1 Using Bartik’s elasticity fi gure again (−0.3) and the lower 
revenue fi gure, annual revenue losses for each new, induced job would 
be about $7,000. If one agrees with Wasylenko (1997) that −0.2 is a 
more likely elasticity, and uses the higher revenue fi gure ($3,700), the 
fi scal losses more than double, to $14,900. 
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Let’s be clear what these numbers mean. If a state embarks on a pro-
gram of tax incentives that ends up attracting 100 new jobs that would 
not have been there but for the incentives, the state and its local govern-
ments should expect to have $700,000–$1,490,000 less in business tax 
revenues each and every year (assuming an elasticity of −0.2 to −0.3) 
than they would have had without the tax incentive program. All this to 
provide an estimated 77 jobs to people who have migrated to the state 
and 23 jobs to existing residents who otherwise would have been unem-
ployed or not in the labor force. 
The importance of Bartik’s formulation is that it effectively under-
cuts the arguments of public offi cials and development practitioners 
that job creation is not only good policy, it is free policy—we can create 
jobs and add revenue at the same time. But let’s look at the competi-
tion for business as if communities were offering sites at varying “tax 
prices,” where a tax price is the cost to the business of a unit of public 
services. The problem for communities is that in this competition for 
capital, they are operating on an inelastic demand curve. Basic eco-
nomic analysis tells us that when you cut price in the face of inelastic 
demand, you lose revenue. 
States and communities that respond to the competitive environ-
ment by offering ever more generous incentives, as has been the pat-
tern for the past two decades, on the grounds that this generosity will 
be rewarded with more investment, are in effect saying, “We lose a 
little more on each plant, but we’re going to make it up in volume.” Of 
course, larger incentives are more effective, but total fi scal losses rise 
proportionately. This is because the gains from additional induced jobs 
continue to be offset by ever larger losses from all the jobs that would 
have been there anyway but now are paying little in taxes. It can be 
shown that the percentage of new jobs that are actually induced can 
be found by multiplying the elasticity by the percentage cut in taxes 
(Peters and Fisher 2002, Appendix C). With an elasticity of −0.3 and a 
fairly typical incentive package amounting to a 30 percent cut in taxes, 
only 9 percent of the new jobs arriving in a community will be attribut-
able to the tax cut. The incentives provided to the other 91 percent are 
a pure waste of money. 
If we are evaluating the fi scal consequences of incentives, however, 
we would want a formulation that measures the effects of cuts in mar-
ginal tax rates on the gross fl ow of economic activity (annual establish-
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ment births, for example). Most of the research on taxes and business 
activity, however, has measured changes in the average level of business 
taxation and changes in the level of employment. My own research with 
Alan Peters (Peters and Fisher 2002, Appendix C) has shown that cuts 
in marginal tax rates have identical long-run effects to cuts in average 
tax rates only under the fairly restrictive condition that the marginal rate 
cuts are constant and permanent. But most incentives are neither; they 
are one-time grants or the equivalent in tax expenditures, or they are of 
limited duration, and generally front-loaded (the percentage abatement, 
for example, declining over time). 
We have also shown that one cannot generalize from the fi scal ef-
fects of providing an incentive for one fi rm, to the fi scal effects of adopt-
ing an ongoing incentive program that will apply to the stream of estab-
lishments entering the community in all future years. Here communi-
ties face an additional problem (beyond the inelasticity of demand): the 
fi rms they do succeed in attracting don’t stay forever. The argument for 
incentives rather than permanent cuts is made on fi scal grounds: they 
are front-loaded or temporary precisely because offi cials count on the 
fi rms paying the full rate in the future. 
But local offi cials appear to routinely overestimate the longevity 
of business establishments. There is in fact a substantial gross fl ow of 
establishments into and out of communities every year. Data from the 
Census Bureau’s Standard Statistical Establishment List show that on 
average during the early 1990s, establishment births and moves into a 
particular zip code (approximating an enterprise zone) averaged about 
9.5 percent of the existing number of establishments per year; rates of 
establishment deaths or moves out were about 1.5 percentage points 
higher (Peters and Fisher 2002). Non-enterprise zone zip codes showed 
even higher rates of establishment births and deaths. Such high rates of 
turnover imply average lifespans that are not all that long. 
There are only a few studies of the survival rates of business estab-
lishments. One study showed a median survival time of about 8.3 years 
for dependent establishments (branch plants) in goods-producing sec-
tors (Boden 2000). This overstates the case to the extent that the surviv-
al distributions in the study cited were driven by large numbers of new, 
small businesses—the mean employment size was about 16—while in-
centives are generally focused on larger fi rms and branch plants. Stud-
ies have consistently found that the larger the initial employment size, 
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the higher the survival rates. Data from the tax abatement program in 
Ohio, however, for 1,581 abatement agreements established between 
1990 and 1997, shows that the median size establishment granted abate-
ments for the creation of jobs was only about 70 employees, not as large 
as one might think.2 Another study, moreover, indicated that the median 
survival rate even for larger establishments (over 50 employees) was 
only in the neighborhood of eight years (Joel Popkin and Company 
1991). And this is at the national level, where only births and deaths 
matter. At the local level, relocations would reduce these rates. 
What is the signifi cance of this? Property tax abatements are often 
spread over an 8- to 10-year period, and states often grant generous 
tax credits that are not refundable and therefore cannot be used up in 
the fi rst year but must be carried forward (sometimes for as long as 10 
years), eliminating tax liability in all of those years. If the median life 
expectancy of a new establishment in a community is about 8 to 10 
years, this means that over half of the establishments granted abate-
ments or credits will no longer be around to pay the full tax rate. 
Even these estimates of the direct revenue losses from tax incen-
tives or business tax cuts are overly optimistic. The reason is that they 
are based on research showing the elasticity of business activity with 
respect to tax cuts, holding all else constant, including the level of pub-
lic services. State and local governments must balance their budgets, so 
that business tax cuts, in practice, must be accompanied either by reduc-
tions in services or increases in taxes on other property or individuals. 
There has been substantial research showing that business activity is 
responsive to service levels as well, and some have even argued that tax 
increases accompanied by spending increases on nonwelfare services 
would have a positive effect on growth (see Bartik 1996; Fisher 1997). 
Thus, in the real world, incentive programs that come at the expense of 
public services would not generate even the modest levels of induced 
investment assumed above. The elasticities would be lower, probably 
close to zero, which means the direct fi scal effects are much higher 
(remember that with an elasticity of −0.1, the average annual loss rises 
to $33,500 per job). With a zero elasticity, of course, the net total fi scal 
effect is simply the total expenditure on incentives, since there are no 
induced jobs. 
Some readers might say at this point, “But wait—you keep talking 
about elasticities of −0.2 or −0.3, or even lower, but those are interstate 
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or intermetropolitan elasticities; we know that taxes have much larger 
effects on location within a metropolitan area.” It is true that economists 
have long argued that taxes are most likely to alter location decisions 
within a given metropolitan area, since the other determinants of loca-
tion (labor cost, utilities, access to markets) will be the same throughout 
the area, leaving room for differences in less signifi cant costs (such as 
local property tax differentials) to tip the balance. It is also true that 
the empirical research has generally borne this out, though there are 
far fewer studies and a wider range of elasticities. But all this tells us 
is that incentives are most likely to work precisely where they are least 
justifi ed—moving jobs around within the same labor market. And while 
the higher elasticities (above 1.0) mean that a particular locality may in-
deed gain revenue, this will come at the expense of its neighbors. Even 
worse, to the extent that the state contributes to incentive packages, 
state government will be paying cities to engage in a beggar-thy-neigh-
bor strategy. Surely the sensible way to approach the fi scal issue is to 
ask whether a state and the state’s local governments, in the aggregate, 
gain or lose. And the answer is that they lose. 
Incentive programs in the last 20 years have assumed a life of their 
own; they are viewed as essential policy in good times and bad, in poor 
states and rich states. And state and local offi cials see themselves in a 
never-ending arms race. The results have been documented in terms of 
the escalating cost per job of the most publicized incentive battles for 
large facilities. But the same thing is happening, albeit much more qui-
etly, with the more routine incentive programs that function as entitle-
ments. In my research with Alan Peters we have modeled the state and 
local tax systems and incentive programs in 20 states, and were able to 
measure the average effective tax rate on a new plant built by a multi-
state manufacturing fi rm in each of these 20 states in 1990 and 1998. 
We also measured the effect of state and local tax incentives in lowering 
this effective rate. The results are shown in Figure 3.1.
The effective tax rate before incentives declined during this period 
by about half a percentage point, but the rate after incentives declined 
even more, by 1.3 percentage points. In just eight years, in other words, 
there was a 30 percent drop in the effective tax rate on new investment. 
Over this eight-year period, the average incentive package rose from 
about 10 percent of gross state-local taxes, to about 29 percent (Fisher 
2002).
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THE LARGER CONSEQUENCES OF COMPETITION 
We turn now to the effects of competition on tax policy more gen-
erally. It is clear from debates about tax policy in the last decade that 
competitiveness arguments are at the forefront. 
How have these arguments changed business taxation and state/lo-
cal taxes and budgets?
The Decline of the Corporate Income Tax
One of the most signifi cant trends in the past 20 years has been the 
shift in apportionment formulas away from the standard three-factor 
towards formulas that weight sales more heavily.3 As recently as 1980, 
only fi ve states weighted sales more heavily; by 1999, this number had 
increased to 33 (Stark 2002). The most common formula in 1999 in-
Figure 3.1  Effective Corporate Income Tax Rates on Manufacturing 
Investment in 20 States (%)
SOURCE: Fisher (2002).
   Without incentives          With incentives
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volved double weighted sales (24 states); four states used single-fac-
tor apportionment (100 percent on the basis of sales) exclusively, and 
another four allowed it as an option or allowed it for certain sectors. 
These measures are invariably touted as a means to make the state more 
attractive to exporting fi rms, and this argument continues to be used as 
more states consider moving towards single-factor apportionment. 
The effects of single-factor apportionment are to reduce state tax 
revenues. Massachusetts, which adopted single-factor in 1996, lost an 
estimated $182 million in FY2001 as a result, while Illinois lost $95 
million in FY1999 and Pennsylvania lost $89.7 million in FY2002 from 
their triple-weighted sales formula (Gavin 2001; Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts 2001; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2001). 
What is the end result of the proliferation of incentives, the shift 
toward single-factor apportionment, and other measures that cut the ef-
fective state/local tax rate on business? The clearest picture emerges 
when we look at the decline in corporate income tax revenues as a share 
of total state/local tax revenue. Figure 3.2 shows that this share peaked 
near 10 percent in 1979–1980, dropped to around 8 percent through 
the rest of the 1980s, and then began a precipitous decline to around 6 
percent during the most recent 6–7 years.
Corporate income tax revenues have also declined as a share of 
gross state product (GSP). Figure 3.3 below shows that this share de-
clined substantially over the past 25 years, falling from 0.51 percent in 
1980 to 0.27 percent by 2004.
During the past 25 years there has also been a decline in the aver-
age effective state/local corporate income tax rate, as measured by total 
state-local corporate income tax collections divided by corporate prof-
its. These estimates are shown in Figure 3.4. The reason for the uptick 
in rates in 1999–2001 is not obvious.4 The decade-to-decade trend re-
mains pretty clear, however. The rate averaged 5.6 percent in the 1970s, 
6.9 percent in the 1980s, and 5.1 percent from 1990 through 2002. 
Is all of this decline in the corporate income tax due to competitive 
pressures to cut rates, pursue exporting fi rms through heavier weight-
ing of sales factors, and adopt ever more generous credits and exemp-
tions? No, it isn’t. Some of the decline is due to the increasing use of 
pass-through entities: S corporations and limited liability companies 
(LLCs). One study estimated that the rise of LLCs appears to have re-
duced state corporate income tax revenue by about one-third (Fox and 
Luna 2003).
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Figure 3.2  Corporate Income Tax as a Percent of Total State Tax 
Revenue: 1975–2005
SOURCE: Data prior to 1991 from U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations (1992, p. 120); data for 1991–2005 from U.S. Census Bureau (2006).
Figure 3.3  Corporate Income Tax Revenue as a Percent of GSP, All 
States, 1980–2004
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. Data for GSP from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis (2005); data for corporate income tax revenue from U.S. Census Bureau (2006).
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Another factor that cannot be ignored is the increasing use of tax 
avoidance schemes. The most notorious of these are the passive invest-
ment companies (PICS) whereby a fi rm establishes a shell subsidiary in 
Delaware and transfers rights to the store name or logo or trademark to 
the subsidiary. The subsidiary then charges royalties to the parent fi rm’s 
operating establishments across the country for use of this intangible 
property, effectively transferring profi ts from states where the fi rm actu-
ally has a presence (because the royalty expense is deducted from profi ts 
in those states) to Delaware, which does not tax royalty income (Maze-
rov 2003). Even here, competitiveness arguments are made. When the 
governor of Iowa proposed closing this loophole (which costs the state 
an estimated $25–$40 million annually), legislative leaders rejected the 
idea on the grounds that it was a tax increase on business, and the Iowa 
economy could not afford to drive business out of the state by increas-
ing taxes. Profi t shifting and other tax avoidance measures appear to 
have accounted for about a third of the decline in corporate tax revenue 
in Iowa from 1980 to 2004 (Fisher 2006).
Figure 3.4  Average Effective State and Local Corporate Income Tax 
Rate, 1970–2002 (%)
SOURCE: Maguire (2003).
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The Shift Away from Business Taxes
State and local tax policy since 1980 has shifted the composition 
of taxes away from taxes with an initial impact on business. The share 
of state and local taxes paid by businesses declined from 46.5 percent 
in 1980 to 44.0 percent in 1990 and to 40.7 percent in 2000, before ris-
ing back to 42.5 percent in 2003 (as the recession and earlier income 
tax cuts eroded personal income tax revenues dramatically) (Bradley 
2003). State and local taxes paid by business also declined as a percent 
of personal income, from 4.9 percent in 1980 and in 1990, to about 4.4 
percent in 2000 and in 2003. The pattern is the same if one measures 
the burden relative to private sector GDP. Importantly, the taxes with 
an initial impact on business that have shown growth since FY2000 
are overwhelmingly the taxes that are most likely to be shifted forward 
to consumers—property taxes (much of which are on rental property) 
and sales and excise taxes—and the payroll taxes, which are generally 
thought to be borne by employees (Bradley 2003). 
The Increasing Regressivity of State and Local Taxes 
Has the decline in the importance of the corporate income tax, and 
the shift away from business taxes generally, affected the distribution 
of the state local tax burden? We do know that state and local tax sys-
tems are, by and large, quite regressive. In 1989, the lowest 20 percent 
of families by income paid, on average, 10.2 percent of their income 
in state and local taxes, while the top 20 percent paid only 7.5 percent, 
and the top 1 percent just 5.5 percent. And indeed they have become 
more regressive in the past 15 years: by 2002 the effective tax rate on 
the bottom two quintiles had risen by about a percentage point. The ef-
fective rate on the top 20 percent, by contrast, had fallen slightly, from 
7.5 percent to 7.3 percent, and the tax rate for the richest 1 percent had 
fallen from 5.5 percent to 5.2 percent (see Table 3.1). 
What happened between 1989 and 2002? In the early part of the de-
cade, many states raised taxes to solve budget shortfalls brought about 
by the recession. The tendency was to increase regressive taxes, mostly 
sales. When the economic boom of the latter 1990s started producing 
large surpluses, states cut taxes, but instead of rolling back the regres-
sive increases of the early 1990s, they slashed the only progressive tax 
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at the state and local level—the personal income tax. The result was a 
substantial shift in tax burdens by the end of the decade from the highest 
to the lowest income taxpayers, and an increase in overall regressivity. 
This trend continued during the recession and budget crises of 2001–
2003. Many states increased taxes during this period, but 62 percent of 
the state tax increases from late 2001 through 2003 were in regressive 
taxes. State sales and excise taxes were increased $9.9 billion during 
this period, while individual income tax increases amounted to $3.4 bil-
lion, and corporate income taxes to $3.7 billion (Johnson, Shiess, and 
Llobrera 2003). This trend did not continue into 2004–2005, however, 
as state revenues recovered. Over those two years, state personal and 
corporate income taxes were increased by about $1 billion but sales tax-
es were cut (by a similar amount). At the same time, 10 states increased 
tobacco taxes, which are quite regressive, by a total of about $1.6 bil-
lion (Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government 2004, 2006). 
Has competition for business played a role in these trends? While 
the corporate income tax is no longer a signifi cant source of state rev-
enue, there is evidence that the battleground has shifted to the personal 
income tax. Increasingly, one is hearing arguments that the top personal 
income tax rate is too high, or that personal income taxes in general 
must be cut in order to attract business. There has been little research 
directly addressing the question of whether or not interstate differences 
in personal income tax rates affect economic growth, but there is reason 
to be highly skeptical. For corporations, at least, even if they treated 
personal taxes as a labor cost—which is quite doubtful—differences 








20% Top 20% Top 1%
1989 10.2 9.4 8.8 8.4 7.5 5.5
2002 11.4 10.3 9.6 8.8 7.3 5.2
Change (%) +1.2 +0.8 +0.7 +0.4 −0.1 −0.3
Table 3.1  State and Local Taxes as Shares of Family Income
NOTE: Tax burdens are shown after the federal offset; that is, these are the net burdens 
on families after taking into account the deductibility of state and local taxes on fed-
eral returns for those who itemize (generally higher-income taxpayers).
SOURCE: Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2003, pp. 118–119).
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costs (see Fisher and Ditsler 2003). It simply defi es logic that location 
choices would be altered by such small differences in the after-tax cost 
of living of a fi rm’s employees, or that a corporation would move its 
facilities to a neighboring state so that its CEO could save a little in state 
income taxes. Yet these arguments are being made. 
These trends have not produced major shifts in the composition of 
state-local tax systems, other than the decline in the corporate income 
tax. The typical state tax system relies primarily on a mildly progres-
sive personal income tax and a regressive sales tax that includes a lim-
ited number of services in the tax base. Such a tax system (particularly 
if the income tax is not indexed) will become more progressive over 
time if left to its own devices, as infl ation pushes people into higher tax 
brackets and the average income tax rate rises slowly, while the shift in 
consumption patterns from goods to services, combined with increasing 
internet purchases of goods, steadily erodes the sales tax base. Thus the 
effects of recent tax policies—cutting income taxes and business taxes 
in good times and raising regressive taxes in bad times—will not neces-
sarily show up as a dramatic shift from income to excise taxes. 
Other Shifts in State and Local Revenue Sources and 
Spending Priorities
It would be reasonable to hypothesize that the competition for busi-
ness investment and jobs has had other effects on state and local bud-
gets. Has it shifted revenues increasingly to current charges, which are 
among the most regressive of fi nancing tools? In the 12 years from fi s-
cal years 1991–1992 to 2003–2004, current charges as a share of own-
source general revenue of state and local governments increased sig-
nifi cantly, from 17.1 percent to 19.7 percent.5 In no small part this was 
due to rising tuition at public universities; some 34 states raised tuition 
for the 2003–2004 year by more than 10 percent (Johnson, Shiess, and 
Llobrera 2003, p. 14).
Have state budgets increasingly focused on spending that more di-
rectly benefi ts business, such as infrastructure (streets, airports, water, 
sewer) and police and fi re protection, and away from social services, 
education, and natural resources? While such effects may be occurring, 
we do not have a good counterfactual—what would spending priorities 
have been in the absence of the climate of competition? If these effects 
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have been occurring, they have not yet revealed themselves in notice-
able shifts in overall spending since the start of the 1990s. 
THE ROLE OF COMPETITION FOR CAPITAL 
What have we concluded so far?
• The one-time package deals negotiated by states and cities may 
or may not be a good deal fi scally for local governments or for 
state governments; the Greenstone and Moretti (2003) paper 
certainly has not established that they are, and there is good rea-
son to believe many of these incentives have been granted un-
necessarily.
• Entitlement incentives and tax cuts are quite costly to state and 
local governments, and this is probably where the bulk of eco-
nomic development expenditure is found. Given the lack of 
responsiveness of economic activity to differences in taxation, 
state and local governments must spend large amounts of tax 
revenue for small gains in employment, and when the tax cuts 
are accompanied by service cuts it is likely that even these small 
gains disappear. Incentive wars and corporate income tax cuts in 
the name of economic development show no signs of abating.
• The corporate income tax is in danger of disappearing at the state 
level, and business taxes in general have declined somewhat in 
importance.
• State and local tax systems have become more regressive; tax cuts 
in the latter 1990s were almost entirely focused on the income tax, 
while tax increases during the recessions of the early 1990s and of 
2001–2003 were concentrated on regressive consumption taxes. 
Governments are making increasing use of charges for services.
Let us not be too hasty, however, in attributing all of these fi scal ef-
fects to interstate and interlocal competition for capital. If we are look-
ing for culprits, there are other plausible candidates. First of all, there 
are the “starve-the-beasters,” to use Paul Krugman’s term to describe 
the apostles of the strategy favored by Ronald Reagan’s budget director, 
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David Stockman (Krugman 2003). The idea here is fi rst to pass large 
tax cuts (because they are demonstrably popular) without specifying 
any service reductions, and then to slash spending on the grounds that 
we cannot afford to fi nance (selected) services. We shrink Leviathan 
by starving it. While this is arguably the underlying motivation behind 
Republican-led federal tax cuts since the early 1980s, it is clear that 
there are many in state legislatures who have been pursuing the same 
strategy in recent years.
If starving the beast is the underlying agenda, then competitiveness 
arguments are merely a convenient public rationale. A starve-the-beast-
er does not have to believe that tax cuts “work,” though he may believe 
so. He has merely to convince others that this is a plausible argument.
Another potential culprit at the federal level, as Krugman (2003) 
points out, is the supply-sider. Here, tax cuts are favored on the grounds 
that by relieving the tax burden on investment, we will generate more 
of it, whether by expansion of existing fi rms or attraction of new ones. 
The economic growth that ensues will generate suffi cient new tax base 
to ultimately pay for the tax cuts. The Bush administration has in fact 
built quite optimistic supply-side growth effects into its models for pro-
jecting the size of the federal defi cit. 
At the state level, supply-side arguments (that business tax cuts will 
pay for themselves) are even less plausible due to the openness of a 
state economy. One hears the supply-side arguments anyway; the fact 
that past tax cuts have not only failed to pay for themselves but are 
major contributors to the current fi scal crises of the states goes unac-
knowledged. The supply-side position is even, on occasion, bolstered 
by a demand-side argument—that putting more money into the hands 
of business and consumers via tax cuts will stimulate demand for the 
state’s products and spur growth. This despite the obvious problem that 
states must balance their budgets, so that every dollar put into the econ-
omy through tax cuts is taken out by spending cuts. And if the spending 
leakages that occur with tax cuts are greater than the leakages associ-
ated with budget cuts, the demand-side effect could be negative. 
A third potential culprit is the attack on income redistribution, oth-
erwise known as class warfare. A substantial chorus of voices from the 
right has been calling for a reduction in progressive taxes, and they are 
fond of pointing out how much the rich pay (invariably focusing ex-
clusively on the federal income tax as if that were the only tax anyone 
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pays). Again, if this is the underlying motivation for cuts in taxes on 
business, then competitiveness arguments are merely a more publicly 
acceptable rationale, not the real reason. Attacks on progressivity are 
dressed up as policies to promote jobs for the unemployed. Incredibly, 
competitiveness arguments have even been put forth to advocate for 
cuts in state taxes on capital gains and for elimination of state inheri-
tance taxes. Conservative think tanks have been promoting the idea 
that cuts in state personal income taxes, and capital gains taxes in par-
ticular, will stimulate venture capital investment and entrepreneurial 
activity in that state. Inheritance taxes are blamed for the closing of 
family businesses.
 It is, of course, impossible to disentangle the effects of these four 
possible factors driving the reduction in business taxes: the perceived 
need to be “competitive,” the starve-the-beast attack on the public sec-
tor, the supply-siders’ notion of self-fi nancing tax cuts, and the attempt 
to augment the success of the private economy in redistributing income 
upwards. There is abundant circumstantial evidence, however, that the 
starve-the-beast strategy is widely embraced on the right. There is also 
evidence for the attack on income redistribution, as can be seen by what 
has happened over the past 15 years to state and local tax systems. It 
is diffi cult to argue that the overwhelming trend towards increases in 
regressive taxes on consumption, coupled with reductions in progres-
sive taxes on income and inherited wealth, can be explained solely by 
economic development concerns. 
In the end, the most plausible hypothesis, I would argue, is that 
there is a complex of strategies and agendas and beliefs that have been 
working in concert (and, yes, there is evidence that this has been a 
coordinated effort, through such groups as the American Legislative 
Exchange Council) to produce increases in incentive packages and 
incentive entitlements, cuts in business taxes, and cuts in progressive 
personal taxes. The result is a fi scal crisis for state and local govern-
ment (not to mention an enormous federal defi cit) and an increasingly 
regressive tax system. 
There are indeed those who truly believe the supply-side arguments, 
and those who truly believe the competitiveness arguments, and some 
of these folks may not also subscribe to the belief that any cut in gov-
ernment spending is a good thing, or that the rich need tax relief. Still, 
it is certainly very convenient and useful, if one is a starve-the-beaster 
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or reverse Robin Hood, that there are such true believers, in right-wing 
think tanks and state legislatures and in the press, for they have been 
providing excellent cover. They keep the debate focused on questions 
such as, “Do tax cuts spur growth?” where one can always fi nd an ar-
gument or statistic to support the position that they do. Journalists and 
public offi cials are, by and large, simply not equipped to sort out the 
valid claims from the spurious ones, and competitiveness and supply 
side assertions are simply repeated so often, and with such impunity, 
that the public comes to believe that these arguments are valid and are 
made in good faith.6 
Whether or not competition for capital is in fact driving all of these 
fi scal changes (i.e., whether or not it is the real cause), it is clear that 
it is the driving issue whenever there are public debates about taxes 
and budgets. Advocacy organizations around the country—nonprofi ts 
working at the state and local levels on tax and budget issues, on child 
and family policy, on poverty, housing, education, and workforce de-
velopment—continually fi nd themselves up against the tax competi-
tiveness argument. An alleged threat to competitiveness can effectively 
put a stop to attempts to fund social programs, to forestall the weaken-
ing of business regulation, or to adopt more progressive tax policies. 
Whether it is a useful counterstrategy to engage the debate on these 
terms—to continue to present the evidence on the tax competition is-
sue, as if one is really just participating in a discussion about economic 
development policy among citizens and politicians with common goals 
and values—is a question for another chapter, or another day.
Notes
 1.  Total state and local taxes paid directly by business were $404.3 billion in fi scal 
year 2003, according to Cline et al. (2004). Private nonfarm employment was 
about 108,592,000, yielding taxes per job of $3,723 (USDOL n.d.). 
 2. Analysis by the author of the State of Ohio’s enterprise zone agreement data-
base.
 3.  Corporations must apportion their overall profi ts to the states in which they do 
business in order to determine what share of total profi ts is taxable in a given 
state. Each state has its own rules for apportionment, the traditional approach 
being three factor apportionment, where the fi rm takes a simple average of three 
ratios: property in state X divided by total fi rm property, payroll in state X over 
total payroll, and sales to state X over total sales. Single factor apportionment 
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uses only the sales ratio, and thus rewards domestic fi rms that export and penal-
izes foreign fi rms that sell in the state. 
 4.   The federal corporate rate also rose in 1999, jumped up in 2000, then fell some-
what in 2001 and 2002, just as the state rate did. This suggests that the explana-
tion lies in the determination of federal taxable income, not in changes in the way 
states taxed the part of that taxable income that was apportioned to each state. 
In other words, something happened to increase the share of corporate profi ts as 
measured by NIPA (the denominator in Maguire’s tax rates) that becomes tax-
able income (which determines the numerator, along with tax rates, which we 
know did not rise). IRS corporate tax return data shows that the explanation does 
not lie in lesser use of deductions from net income in 1999 and 2000. Instead, 
a larger share of NIPA profi ts ended up as taxable income. In part, this was due 
to many more returns with net losses in 2000, which are combined with returns 
showing positive profi ts to arrive at aggregate NIPA profi ts (thus lowering the 
denominator), yet it is only the returns with positive profi ts that generate taxable 
income and taxes (the numerator). It is also possible that the IRS clamped down 
on abusive tax shelters in 1999 and 2000, notably the use of LILO (lease in, lease 
out) schemes, and it is taking a few years for corporate tax departments to fi nd 
new ways to shelter profi ts.
 5.  U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Governments.
 6.  I recently spoke at a large public hearing on the state budget about the fact that 
our tax policies were driven largely by mythology, and was amazed to fi nd that 
for most people this was the fi rst time they had ever heard anyone argue that tax 
cuts might not be a good thing for the economy. I had heard the competitiveness 
argument, for cutting services rather than raising taxes, put forth twice by public 
offi cials just that day—in a newspaper report that morning and on a radio inter-
view on the way to the hearing.
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